This paper investigates and quantifies the impact of parallel trade in markets for pharmaceuticals. The paper develops a structural model of demand and supply using data on price, sales, and the characteristics of statins in Denmark and simulates outcomes under a complete ban of parallel imports, keeping other regulatory schemes unchanged. There are two sets of key results. The first set focuses on price effects.
INTRODUCTION
Parallel trade refers to the practice where products are legally marketed in one country but distributed in another country without authorization of the property rights holder. In the European market for pharmaceuticals, governmental health-care agencies attempt to provide innovative, safe, effective, and affordable pharmaceuticals, while keeping costs under control. To reach this goal, different regulatory policies across nations are in use. However, it has been argued that these differences in regulatory strategies generate significant price dispersion and hence induce arbitrage opportunities and a profitable market for parallel trade (Danzon, 1998; Danzon and Chao, 2000) . Whether or not parallel imports in the pharmaceutical industry are beneficial for market participants has been an intensely debated issue. Opponents of parallel trade argue that parallel imports weaken intellectual property protection, and therefore firms have less incentive to innovate, which generates dynamic inefficiency. Supporters, on the other hand, emphasize that parallel trade benefits consumers because it increases competition leading to lower prices, which in turn generates savings to consumers and insurers. In an attempt to reduce high prices for pharmaceutical products, the European Union has allowed parallel imports within its area. 1 Furthermore, in an effort to achieve and protect the European common market, the European Commission and the European Court of Justice strictly enforce the principle of free movement of goods within the European Union (Article 28 of the consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union).
Firms producing original products have used different strategies to limit parallel trade, such as challenging restrictive distribution agreements with wholesalers, setting supply restrictions in exporter countries, or challenging trademark protection. 4 But parallel trade within the European Union has been enabled and protected through these laws, which prioritize the principle of a common market over the possible welfare losses generated through reduced incentives to innovate. More recent cases have shed light on the importance of considering dynamic inefficiencies (Petrucci, 2010; Tsouloufas, 2011) and the necessity of revising the goals of the EU competition laws (Kyle, 2016) .
An economic perspective
Most of the empirical studies on parallel imports in the pharmaceutical industry have almost exclusively focused on price effects. For instance, Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) use a regulatory change after Sweden joined the European Union in 1995. They estimate a 19% price reduction due to parallel imports for the top 50 molecules in Sweden. 5 In contrast, Kanavos and Costa-Font (2005) study six molecules in 11 European countries during 1997 to 2002. They attribute price decreases in import countries not to parallel trade but rather to generic substitution, and they find evidence for the entry of parallel importers to be determined by price differences between countries. A contribution that takes a different approach is that by Kyle (2011) . She investigates non-price responses to parallel trade because, in this heavily regulated industry, firms are usually limited in the price setting strategies they can adopt in order to compete with parallel trade. Her study reveals that to counteract the competitive pressure from parallel importers, original firms are indeed using non-price strategies to hinder parallel trade, typically by restricting supply, using restrictive distribution agreements, and differentiating products across countries by altering the brand name, dosage form, and strength.
A related study is Enemark, Pedersen, and Sørensen (2006) . The authors use data for four European countries, including Denmark, on the top 50 pharmaceutical products in 2004. They use a reduced-form approach and the prices of original products before any competing parallel importer enters the market to predict how prices would have developed in the absence of parallel imports. They find that parallel trade generated 168 million Danish krones (DKK) in savings. My results contribute to the view that parallel trade does generate substantial savings for consumers and health-care agencies. However, in contrast to Enemark et al. (2006) , I explicitly model and structurally estimate the change in prices taking into consideration price elasticities, patient preferences, and the strategic reaction of firms. The magnitude of the savings predicted in my model is much higher (on average DKK 242.6 million in the market for statins) than are the results in Enemark et al. (2006) , and my model highlights the importance of considering the more complex interactions between pharmaceutical companies, insurance providers, and patients.
Finally, in a contemporaneous paper, Duso, Herr, and Suppliet (2014) examine the welfare effects of parallel trade using data on the German market for oral antidiabetic drugs. Their results suggest a decrease in prices for on-patent products of 11%, no effects for generics, and a modest impact on consumer surplus. Although the geographic and therapeutic markets are different from the ones examined here, their results support my findings. However, my predicted price effects are smaller (around 3%) and my welfare effects are substantial (around 18% of the yearly market's revenue). This can be attributed to my having a richer data set that allows me to use more precise information, such as firm prices to calculate firm profits, pharmacy prices to calculate governmental savings, and consumer prices, which are not fixed to certain levels but vary for each product, to calculate patients' price sensitivity more accurately. In addition, Denmark does not impose minimum quotas directly on the sale of parallel imports at the pharmacy level, nor does it use rebate contracts in the procurement for pharmaceuticals, both of which facilitate a more clean setting in which to investigate my question.
The theoretical literature has gone beyond studying price effects and explores the impact of parallel trade on R&D. Li and Maskus (2006) , Szymanski and Valletti (2006) , and Valletti (2006) conclude that parallel imports have a detrimental effect on incentives to innovate in the long run, but can be beneficial to consumers in the short run. However, Grossman and Lai (2008) show that allowing international parallel trade can benefit innovation, because governments could use different price control tools if international parallel trade were permitted. This issue, although beyond the scope of my paper, is still a relevant question. 
Industry description
The pharmaceutical industry in Denmark has a typical vertical structure. 6 First, at the upstream level, there are three types of firms: original firms, generic firms, and parallel importers. Original firms engage in R&D and manufacture new medicines using intellectual property rights to protect their innovations. Generic firms produce bioequivalent copies of original products and are only allowed to enter the market after the relevant patents have expired. In contrast, parallel importers do not engage in manufacturing, but rather they supply products that are imported from markets outside of Denmark. Typically, parallel importers repackage, relabel, and redistribute (original and generic) products. Since 1990, parallel imports have been legal in Denmark-even for products under patent protection. Second, at the wholesale level, pharmacies purchase pharmaceuticals from upstream firms that are supplied to consumers (patients). Pharmacies operate in a highly regulated market environment, as I detail below. The most important features of the regulation are generic substitution and retail price regulation. Finally, at the downstream level, consumers purchase prescription-only pharmaceuticals from the pharmacies. At the consumer level, the regulator implemented a system of reference pricing that sets reimbursement rules. Importantly, the reimbursement price determines copayment prices, which in turn determine consumers' purchase decisions. Figure 1 illustrates the vertical structure.
Other relevant market features are that Denmark maintains a universal health-care system that is financed through general tax revenues; advertising prescription drugs directly to patients is prohibited; and detailing (marketing to physicians) is highly regulated and only allowed in the case of original firms introducing new molecules.
Regulatory framework
Governmental safety concerns and budget constraints generate a high degree of regulation on pharmaceutical markets. In Europe, price regulation and reimbursement rules relating to pharmaceuticals are a national decision. Denmark's regulatory body has adopted a policy of free pricing at the upstream level. However, the upstream firms must report their prices to the Danish Medicines Agency (DKMA). Every second week, the DKMA updates prices and product availability in a publicly available list. This list is used by doctors when issuing prescriptions, by hospitals for their electronic patient records, by pharmacies to ensure availability of products, and by consumers to obtain information about (copayment) prices of available substitutes. Next, I discuss pharmacy regulation and follow it with a description of the reimbursement rules that determine copayment prices.
Pharmacy regulation
Pharmacies face two types of regulation: generic substitution and retail price regulation. Danish pharmacists are required by law to dispense the cheapest product among available substitutes, unless the consumer or the doctor explicitly requests another product. Generic substitution for off-patent products has been encouraged since 1991.
Pharmacy retail prices p c for prescription-only pharmaceuticals are identical nationwide and can be decomposed, as follows:
where p f is the pharmacy purchase price (at the wholesale level), is the regulated markup above the pharmacy purchase price, and k is the prescription fee (including value added tax). 7 Notice that, in effect, retail price regulation determines pharmacies' unit margins.
Reimbursement rules
The final price paid by consumers is the copayment price, that is, the pharmacy retail price adjusted for reimbursement. Specifically, the copayment price p cop is given by
where p c is the pharmacy retail price and p r is the reference price. The reference price for a given product is set equal to its own pharmacy retail price as long as it is below the average price in EU-15 (excluding Greece, Luxembourg, Spain, and Portugal). 8 The 80% reimbursement of the reference price applies for consumers with yearly expenditures exceeding DKK 2,950 (€395). 9 Substitution groups are defined by DKMA guidelines. Products are assigned to the same substitution group if they have the same active ingredient, administration form, strength, and similar package size. Importantly, consumers can freely choose among products in the same substitution group. This reimbursement rule, although allowing consumers some freedom of choice, does influence consumers' price sensitivity by covering only a fraction of their expenditures. Therefore, reference pricing is a widely used measure for cost containment (Espín, Rovira, & Olry de Labry, 2011; López-Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy, 2000) . 10 Brekke et al. (2007 , 2009 ), Kaiser, Mendez, Rønde, and Ullrich (2014 , and Pavcnik (2002) empirically investigate the impact of reference pricing on consumer and government expenditures.
THE DATA
I use data from the market of statins during the time period May 2003 to March 2005. Price data and product characteristics were obtained from DKMA. Sales data were made available from the Danish Association of the Pharmaceutical Industry (LIF). I observe fortnightly prices and sales for 213 products sold in Denmark which belong to the molecules in the therapeutic group of HMG CoA reductase inhibitors (commonly known as statins). A product is defined by four attributes: active substance, strength, package size, and firm. The active substance is captured by the molecule classified by the five-level ATC code. Strength measures the amount of the active substance in milligrams per pill. Package size is simply the number of pills per package.
There are six molecules, out of which three are off-patent or have lost patent protection during the observed time period (simvastatin, lovastatin, and pravastatin). The other molecules are on-patent (fluvastatin, atorvastatin, and rosuvastatin). Table 1 provides an overview and indicates the ATC codes. In addition, the table provides information about brand names, patent owners, and the average number of firms and products in each molecule. The best known statins sell under the trade names Lipitor (Pfizer) and Zocor (MSD Sharp & Dohme) and are top-selling medicines in terms of quantity and revenue. In 2004, the Danish market for statins generated around DKK 320 million (€43 million).
Generic firms also sell versions of the first three molecules (C10AA01-C10AA03). In contrast, the molecules fluvastatin (C10AA04), atorvastatin (C10AA05), and rosuvastatin (C10AA07) are protected by an active patent and sold by original firms and parallel importers only.
To make different products comparable, I normalize prices and quantities using defined daily doses (DDDs). This measure is proposed by the World Health Organization and widely used in the pharmaceutical industry. Table 2 shows average pharmacy purchase prices p f , reference prices p r , and copayment prices p cop . All prices are deflated using the consumer price index with 2005 as basis year. The summary is organized as follows: Part A shows averages for all products and Part B presents the results by molecule, Part C by firm type, and Part D by the patent status. Pharmacies buy one DDD for around DKK 6 (around €0.80), and consumers' copayment is on average DKK 3.2 (€0.40). As noted in Kanavos and Costa-Font (2005) , the pharmacy purchase price for parallel imports lies just below the price for original products and significantly above generic prices. This could be attributed to the fact that most of the parallel imported products are potentially produced by original firms. This is clear for the three on-patent molecules, and although for the off-patent molecules I do not directly observe the country that exported the parallel imported product, I use as a proxy information about the name under which the product is marketed in Denmark. For safety reasons, this should be the same trade name under which the product is marketed in the exporting country and generic firms cannot use trademark-protected names. Finally, copayments seem to be substantially higher for original products than for parallel imports or generics. Also, consumers pay more for off-patent products than for on-patent products due to the reimbursement rules and the lack of substitutes in the on-patent segment. More specifically, the reference price used to calculate reimbursement is set within each substitution group, which in turn are narrowly defined (products are assigned to the same substitution group if they have the same active ingredient, administration form, strength, and similar package size). As a consequence, products that are on-patent might be the only product in a substitution group, and its own retail price will be used as the reference price. Thus the reimbursement that the patient receives is the highest. This is clearly seen in Table 2 . If we compare C10AA01 (off-patent) and C10AA05 (on-patent), we see that the difference in pharmacy purchase prices is much larger than is the difference in copayment prices. Price regulation and reimbursement rules will play an important role for the counterfactual estimation, in which I find that changes in wholesale prices generated by a prohibition of parallel trade are absorbed mostly by the government and less so by the consumer. 11 Further, Figure 2 shows average pharmacy purchase prices per DDD over time for each type of firm in the six different molecules. Prices for original products are very stable even in the presence of generic products or parallel imports. On the contrary, parallel imports seem to compete with generics once they enter the market. This is mainly visible in the graphic from lovastatin (C10AA02) and pravastatin (C10AA03) where generic entry is clearly observed and is followed by a drop in average prices from parallel imports and generics.
Finally, Table 3 summarizes average sales, revenues, and expenditures. Fortnightly sales are in volume terms and amount to about 2.4 million DDD on average for a period of 14 days. The most popular products are simvastatin (C10AA01) and atorvastatin (C10AA05), which sell on average at a fortnightly rate of around 1.7 million DDD and 0.5 million DDD, respectively. Furthermore, most sales come from generic products. Revenues are calculated as pharmacy purchase price times sold DDDs. The fortnightly market for statins is worth on average DKK 9 million. Original firms account for the highest revenues, whereas revenues for generics and parallel imports are substantially lower. Government expenditure, in the form of reimbursement costs, amounts to DKK 10.3 million on average for a period of 14 days. Finally, consumers pay only a fraction of the cost (copayment price times consumed DDDs); their fortnightly expenditures are on average DKK 3.3 million. 
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
The empirical framework has two main components: demand estimation and supply estimation. The estimation draws on Berry (1994) , Stern (1996) , and Verboven (1996) and contributes to a growing literature on structural estimation in the pharmaceutical industry, as seen in recent work by Branstetter, Chatterjee, and Higgins (2016) , Ching (2010a Ching ( , 2010b , Dubois and Lasio (2014) , Dunn (2012) , Dutta (2011) , and Kaiser et al. (2014) . The first part of this paper specifies a discrete choice model to estimate consumer demand. These estimates are used in the second part to recover the marginal cost of production from firms' profit maximizing conditions. Ultimately, the goal of the analysis is to use the estimates to generate policy implications of a hypothetical ban of parallel imports.
Demand estimation
I consider a market with a set of consumers that are indexed by i. Each consumer chooses the product j ( j = 1, … , J) that maximizes her utility U ij . Consumer choice has a nested logit structure (Berry, 1994) . The nest structure follows from substitution groups defined by the DKMA and represents the prescription ordered by the practitioner. Each nest (g = 1, … , G) includes all original, generic, and parallel imported available products in the same substitution group. Importantly, consumers can freely choose among products in the same substitution group. 12 The utility of a consumer as a function of observed and unobserved product characteristics is
The terms that are invariant across consumers are captured by mean utility j ≡ X j − p cop j + j , which depends on observed product characteristics X j , copayment price p cop j , and product characteristics j (that are unobserved to the econometrician). The nesting structure is reflected in d jg , a dummy equal to one if product j belongs to the set of products J in nest g (J g ) and zero otherwise. ig is common to all products in nest g, and its distribution depends on the nesting parameter . The random-utility term ij represents unobserved consumer-specific heterogeneity. Each ij is assumed to be identically, independently distributed extreme value across consumers and products. Cardell (1997) shows that if ij is i.i.d. extreme value, then ig + (1 − ) ij is also an extreme value random variable. The nesting parameter measures correlation of consumer choices between substitution groups. Products are considered closer substitutes the closer gets to one. If = 1, the model reduces to a simple logit model where there is perfect substitutability of products between nests. However, if = 0, there is no substitution across nests. For the nested logit to be consistent with random-utility maximization, the estimated value for must lie between 0 and 1 (McFadden, 1978) .
The model also includes one nest that is explicitly modeled as the "outside" option. This option allows consumers with high cholesterol to be treated with drugs other than statins, or with lifestyle changes only, such as more sport and a low-fat diet. In the absence of the outside option, a change in the prices of the inside goods, statins, will not have an effect on aggregate output. The price of the single product in the outside option is assumed not to be set in response to the prices of the inside goods and its mean utility is normalized to zero ( 0 ≡ 0).
If each consumer selects the product that provides them with the highest utility and using the distributional assumptions on ij , Berry (1994) shows how to solve for mean utility levels as a function of observed market shares. The market share of product j(s j ) can be decomposed as follows:
where s j|g is the share of product j in nest g and s g is the share of nest g in the market. Following Berry (1994) , these terms are
The nest containing the outside good has only one element (D o = 1); thus the market share of the outside good is
Finally, solving for mean utility levels, the linear equation to be estimated is
The variables included in the vector of observed product characteristics are the strength, package size, a dummy variable indicating if the product is on-patent, and the number of products in the same nest. I further include firm and time period dummy variables in the specification. The key parameters are the coefficient on price and the nesting parameter . These parameters will determine elasticities of demand and thereby influence the substitution patterns of consumers and the price setting of firms. My prior is that has a negative sign such that higher prices are associated with a decrease in mean utility. The nesting parameter should lie between 0 and 1 to be consistent with random-utility maximization.
Instrumental variables
Endogeneity of prices and the conditional share (p cop j and s j|g ) are caused by heterogeneity in preferences affecting the demand substitution patterns and product level attributes that are known to firms and patients but unobserved by the researcher. As a way to correct for this endogeneity, I use instrumental variables that are commonly used in the literature (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) , Nevo (2001) , and more recently Armstrong (2016) , Berry and Haile (2014) , and Reynaert and Verboven (2014) ). These are variables that generate exogenous variation in the choice sets, such as the number of rival firm products, or functions of other products' attributes, such as the sum of characteristics of rival firms. The intuition is that characteristics of product k are not included in the utility function for product j but are correlated with the price and conditional shares of product j only through the markup in the first-order conditions of the profit maximizing firm in oligopolistic competition. In the same way, optimal pricing depends on the characteristics and prices of all products offered, for which higher order polynomials of a firm's own products' characteristics have been suggested as valid instruments. Additional instruments are cost shifters or proxies for costs. I use the average price of products from the same firm in other substitution groups, which captures supply shocks that affect all products from the same firm.
Market size and the outside good
Longstanding elevated levels of cholesterol in the blood induce the formation of plaque in the arteries causing narrowing or even blockage of arteries. This condition is asymptomatic and can go undetected for a long period of time, generating life-threatening problems such as heart attacks or strokes. Total market size includes consumption by both consumers in treatment and potential consumers with high cholesterol levels. In a similar way as Dunn (2012) or Ching, Clark, Horstmann, and Lim (2015) , I use different sources to determine total market size. The first step is to define the fraction of the population with elevated levels of cholesterol. Guidelines recommend a healthy adult to have less than 5 mmol of total cholesterol per liter of blood (mmol/L) and less than 3 mmol/L of low-density lipoprotein cholesterol. According to the Danish Association of Heart Patients (Madsen & Videbaek, 2004 ) and the Danish Institute for Rational Pharmacotherapy (IRF, 2006) , around 60% of the Danish population between 40 and 80 years of age exceed these thresholds. This estimate is in line with a report from the World Health Organization (Roth et al., 2011 ) that shows disease prevalence statistics for countries similar to Denmark, where the percentage of total population aged 40-79 years with high levels of cholesterol lies between 35% and 61%.
Second, total consumption of statins by consumers in treatment is obtained from the Danish Health Data and Disease Control Institute (www.medstat.dk). I assume that if potential consumers were prescribed with statins, they would consume the same dosage as the average actual consumer. The sum of actual consumption and hypothetical consumption by potential consumers gives total market size.
Price elasticities
Finally, the price paid by consumers (p cop ) is the relevant price to calculate the associated elasticities. Using and from the demand estimation, the own-price elasticity for product j in a nested logit is
Cross-price elasticities are expected to be smaller if the products are considered less substitutable. If product j and product k are in the same substitution group, their respective cross-price elasticity is
If product j and product l are not in the same substitution group, the cross-price elasticity is
Supply estimation
On the supply side of the market, there are multiproduct firms that are free to choose their pharmacy purchase price (p f ). Assuming that prices are set in a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, the profit-maximization conditions can be used to recover markups and marginal cost of production.
Each firm f, with f = 1, … , F, produces some subset f of the J products. The profit function of firm f can then be written as follows:
where p f j , c j , and s j are product j's respective pharmacy purchase price, marginal cost, and market share. M is total market size including consumption from actual and potential consumers, and K is the firm's fixed cost.
The first-order condition for product j is
Each firm sets prices for each product considering the price of all of its other products. The set of J first-order conditions characterizes equilibrium prices and can be rewritten in vector form as S(p cop , x, ) − Δ(p cop , x, )(P − C) = 0, where S is the vector of shares, Δ is a J × J matrix with Δ = − s h ∕ p f j if h and j are produced by the same firm and Δ = 0 otherwise, P is the vector of pharmacy purchase prices (p f ), and C a vector of marginal cost. Because the shares are functions of copayment prices, I use Equations 1 and 2 to express everything in terms of pharmacy purchase price, taking into account that prescription fees, pharmacy markups as well as the reference price are exogenously given. Explicitly using reference prices, which in some cases can be the average EU price, partially controls for prices in another countries. This is novel in the literature and relevant because firms, in particular original firms, optimize over all interconnected markets. To capture this behavior is challenging because it is difficult to obtain reliable data on the quantity of a product and price information is almost never publicly available. Another difficulty is that national-level price regulation limits the ability of the firm to set prices freely. Germany, for example, uses tender procedures and rebate contracts to obtain lower prices. Some southern European countries that serve as a source of parallel trade negotiate prices directly with pharmaceutical companies. By using rich information on price setting in Denmark, I can partially control for prices from other surrounding countries. Finally, the J pricing equations can be expressed as marginal cost and markup, where the term Δ −1 S is a measure of predicted markups:
Counterfactual calculation
Removing parallel importers from the market affects the market participants in different ways. Firms face less competition, which is associated with an increase in prices. In addition to facing higher expenditures due to the increase in prices, consumers are confronted with less variety. Consumers that consumed parallel imports substitute towards generics, original products, or the outside option. Finally, the effect of a ban of parallel imports on governmental expenditures depends on the magnitude of changes in prices and the subsequent choices available to consumers. If, for example, former buyers of parallel imports choose original products whose prices then rise, then government expenditures would most likely increase, because the prices of original products are on average higher than are the prices of parallel imports even in the absence of the prohibition.
To calculate the new equilibrium, I use the following three equations. First, I follow the Danish rules and regulations and use Equations 1 and 2 to obtain the counterfactual copayment prices 13 as follows:
Second, eliminating parallel imports does not affect consumer tastes; therefore, I use Equation 4 to obtain counterfactual shares for each product:
where j counter = X j − p cop j counter + j . Finally, removing parallel imports does not affect the marginal cost of production of the remaining firms. 14 Using the same Bertrand-Nash equilibrium assumptions for the price setting behavior of the firms, I calculate counterfactual pharmacy purchase prices using the marginal cost implied by the demand estimates, as follows:
Solving Equations 8, 9, and 10 simultaneously yields the counterfactual market equilibrium prices and shares.
Consumer surplus and welfare
Consumer surplus is (Small & Rosen, 1981 )
I use Equation 11 to calculate yearly consumer surplus with the real data and with the counterfactual data. The difference CS real − CS counterfactual measures the effects on consumer surplus generated by prohibiting parallel imports. This measure not only accounts for possible harm induced by price increases; but because it takes consumers' preferences into consideration, it also captures losses generated by reducing the market variety. 13 The reference price is updated as long as the counterfactual pharmacy retail price remains below the European average price. Otherwise it is set equal to the prevailing average European price. 14 Marginal cost is assumed to be constant; that is, the increment in cost of producing an additional unit at each level of production does not change by removing parallel traders. However, I do allow for marginal cost to change over time.
Finally, I define total welfare as the sum of consumer surplus and firm profits. The difference between real total welfare and counterfactual total welfare mirrors the changes in total welfare from a prohibition on parallel trade. This measure of welfare is static and limited to the effects that this ban has on Denmark, an importing country.
RESULTS
This section reports three sets of empirical findings. First, it presents estimates of the utility parameters and the implied elasticities. Second, it reports cost estimates for the different firm types. Third, this section provides policy implications from a counterfactual analysis.
Demand
Estimating the demand side in Equation 5 yields the empirical counterparts of the utility parameters and the substitution parameters. As expected, the coefficient on copayment price is negative and the nesting parameter is positive.
Estimates are provided in Table 4 . The estimated ordinary least squares coefficient on copayment price is close to zero (−0.053). When controlling for endogeneity, the estimate remains negative, as expected. This means that a higher copayment price reduces consumers' mean utility. Specifically, the IV-nested logit estimate of is −0.832. These estimates are in line with previous findings: Dunn (2012) The ordinary least squares estimate of the nesting parameter is 0.803, which shows a relatively high degree of substitution across different product groups. The degree of substitution is lower when controlling for endogeneity. In this case, the estimate of is 0.315. Both estimates lie between zero and one (which is consistent with random-utility maximization) and are slightly higher than is the value 0.24 reported in Dutta (2011) .
The estimation of the utility parameters yields further insights. First, products with less strength (−0.807) and more pills per package (0.018) are associated with higher market shares. The coefficient on products in groups with patent protection is positive (1.697), whereas the coefficient on the number of products in each substitution group is negative (−0.212), suggesting that a less competitive environment has a positive impact on market shares. Second, the firms' dummy coefficients indicate that consumers have a strong preferences for original firms, followed by parallel importers.
Correct identification of the demand parameters is crucial for determining substitution patterns that will influence the counterfactual calculations. F statistics from the first-stage regression are reported at the bottom of Table 4 . The first-stage F statistic suggests that the instruments are valid and have enough power to correct for endogeneity.
A caveat in my model and in many others that have access to market-level data only is the potential selection bias caused by endogenous entry. Suppose that generic firms only enter markets where high demand is expected. Entry would generate a price decrease and an increase in the quantity supplied. If the model does not correct for endogenous entry, demand in that market would appear to be more price sensitive. Translated to this model, the copayment price coefficient ( ) would be higher than it should be, and the results are more likely to be overestimated. But in the case of statins, during the time period I observe, there is a feature that might mitigate this bias. Four out of six molecules, including the two largest markets in terms of sales and revenues (simvastatin-C10AA01 and atorvastatin-C10AA05) are very stable and do not experience entry or exit. In the other two markets, the patent expired and generics entered the market, but parallel importers were already active in those markets even before the generics were allowed to enter.
The empirical insights regarding the substitution patterns are summarized in Table 5 . It presents the mean own and cross-price elasticities of demand associated with the coefficient estimated from the IV-nested logit and shows that the own-price elasticities are negative and the cross-price elasticities are positive. Part A reports the average elasticities for all products. The mean own-price elasticity is −3.608 and is very similar to the obtained result in Dunn (2012) of −3.11. The results on cross-price elasticities are, as expected, small and much lower if products belong to different substitution groups. Part B of Table 5 reports average elasticities for products in each molecule group. Part C of the table reports elasticities for products in each type of firm. Original firms and parallel importers, both of which charge higher prices, have higher elasticities than generics. The lower own-price elasticity of generics supports the important role of pharmacy incentives (in the Danish case through the rules on generic substitution) (Brekke, Holmås, & Straume, 2013) . Finally, Part D summarizes the results for products off-patent and on-patent. Mean own-price elasticities are higher if the product is off-patent, which is expected to be a more competitive segment. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. The instruments for the IV-nested logit are as follows: the average price of products from the same firm in other substitution groups, the number of products of rival firms, the sum of characteristics of rival firms, and squares of own products' characteristics. DDD = defined daily dose; IV = instrumental variable; OLS = ordinary least squares.
Supply
This section uses the results from the demand side to estimate the supply side in (7). The estimated average marginal cost of production for a unit of DDD is DKK 5.28 (see Table 6 ). This cost estimate is below the average pharmacy purchase price of DKK 5.93 (reported in Table 2 ), implying an average unit margin of DKK 0.65 or 21% of the pharmacy purchase price. Table 6 also reports average production cost and markups at the molecule level, for all three types of firm and by patent status. All marginal costs are positive and of comparable size. This is evidence that price differences across molecules are the result of differences in markups rather than differences in marginal cost of production. The markups are slightly lower than are the price-cost margins reported by Dubois and Lasio (2014) and Brekke et al. (2013) . But they are in line with their findings that original firms have lower margins than generic firms. This is attributed to the lower cost of production of generics in comparison to original products. Interestingly, the table shows that markups differ by the patent status of the molecules. Markups are lower for off-patent molecules and higher for on-patent molecules in absolute values. This result nicely illustrates that competition from generics erodes unit markups, especially for original firms: The on-patent molecules generate higher markups than the off-patent molecules because there is only competition due to parallel imports but not from generics (see Part D of Table 6 ).
Finally, unit markups for generics are relatively high if compared to other geographic markets. This can be attributed to the prevailing reimbursement system. The reference price for a given product is set exogenously at its pharmacy retail price if it is lower than the average EU price, creating an incentive for generic producers to cluster prices around the relatively high EU price. Consequently generics can achieve high unit markups. 15
The impact of parallel trade
To investigate the impact of parallel trade, I first calculate the counterfactual market equilibrium when parallel imported products are eliminated from the consumers' choice set. Next, I compare the market outcome when parallel imports are present to the counterfactual market outcome and derive policy implications. Note. The table reports average marginal cost and markups calculated from the first-order conditions in Equation (7) 
Counterfactual market equilibrium
Solving the system of equations in Section 5.3 yields the new market equilibrium prices and shares, which are used to find the new markups, firm profits, government expenditures, and consumer expenditures. In this section, I compare these results with their counterparts and summarize my findings due to parallel trade as follows. Eliminating parallel trade reduces average prices but results in higher prices for both original products and generic products. Intuitively, average prices decrease because parallel traded products-the cheaper alternative to the original product, but more expensive than the generic alternative-are removed from the market. However, as competitive pressure decreases, this results in higher average prices for original products. Because prices are strategic complements, average prices for generic products increase as well. Furthermore, the copayment prices increase more for original products than for generics, which is caused by the prevailing reimbursement rules. On another dimension, prices in the off-patent sector (for original and generic products) increase more than they do in the on-patent market. This result provides evidence supporting the conjecture of Enemark et al. (2006) that parallel importers of on-patent products do not put competitive pressure on original firms because the price-sensitive market segment that will switch to parallel imports is small or the parallel importer faces capacity constraints. These results on price effects due to parallel trade are reported in Table 7 . The changes in market share are linked to the substitution patterns. The results show that eliminating parallel trade leads to the substitution of parallel imported products with original products.
Original firms benefit from banning parallel imports whereas generic firms lose market share (see Table 8 ). Intuitively, these substitution patterns can be attributed to the strong preferences of consumers for original products and the fact that most parallel imported products are likely to have been produced by original firms, whose perceived quality is presumably closer to original products than to generic products. Moreover, off-patent products gain substantially in market share from a prohibition on parallel imports. The competitive pressure from generic products is also present when parallel trade is prohibited. As with the effects identified in the supply-side results, markups are lower for off-patent molecules and higher for on-patent molecules, even in the absence of parallel trade. Specifically, with a lack of competition of any kind in on-patent markets, original firms increase their markups substantially more than generic firms do. The changes in markups are reported in Table 9 .
Results on the impact of banning parallel trade on profits, government expenditures, and consumers expenditures are presented in Table 10 . Eliminating parallel trade generates an increase in profits and an increase in expenditures. The average profit for original firms in a 14-day period is DKK 0.57 million with the presence of parallel imports; this profit amounts to DKK 4.19 million after parallel imports are removed. On the contrary, the profits generated by generic firms decrease. Government expenditures and consumer expenditures follow the same path: Expenditures of both groups on original products increase substantially more than do their expenditures on generic products.
Policy implications
The results from the counterfactual analysis with respect to consumer surplus and static welfare are summarized in Table 11 . Eliminating parallel importers in Denmark reduces the consumer surplus and increases firm profits, leading to an overall decrease in welfare. The consumer surplus decreases on average by DKK 111.41 million (around $ 18.2 million or €15 million) when parallel importers are removed from the sample. 16 The decrease in consumer surplus is driven by two factors. First, consumers have fewer products to choose from, and because parallel imports are regarded as being closer to original products than generics, they substitute towards original products in the absence of the parallel imports. Second, a less competitive environment is associated with an increase in copayment price, and so consumers of original products face higher prices. Finally, total welfare is given by the sum of consumer surplus and profits. The average welfare loss from a prohibition on parallel imports is DKK 54.9 million per year (around $ 8.9 million or €7.37 million), a substantial amount for a market that generates around DKK 300 million per year.
Furthermore, removing parallel trade increases consumer expenditures as well as government expenditures. On average, yearly government expenditures increase by DKK 182.7 million (see Table 12 ). Yearly consumer expenditures increase on average by DKK 75 million, a figure that differs markedly from that of the consumer surplus. This shows that using consumer expenditures only as a measure of welfare, as is done in previous studies, may result in an underestimation of the total welfare loss. 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyzes the effects of parallel trade in the Danish market for statins. It develops a structural model of demand and supply and uses these estimates to simulate new market outcomes under a hypothetical ban of parallel imports. There are two key results from prohibiting parallel imports. The first set focuses on price effects, which differ along two dimensions: the type of firm and the patent protection status of the molecule. Eliminating parallel trade reduces average prices but results in higher prices for both original products and generic products. Furthermore, average prices for off-patent products decrease, whereas average prices for on-patent products are positively affected by excluding parallel imports. The second set of results reports the effects on market participants, that is, firms, government and consumers. On average, firm profits increase, but the effect is positive for original firms and negative for generic firms. The consumer surplus decreases due to a decrease in product choice and an increase in expenditures. Moreover, government expenditures increase as a result of a prohibition on parallel trade. Finally, total welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus and profits. Eliminating parallel trade leads to an overall decrease in welfare. The results apply to Denmark, and welfare implications are therefore to be interpreted as local and static. My model takes into consideration consumer preferences, which determine substitution patterns, when estimating consumer surplus, as opposed to previous studies that use only consumer expenditures as a welfare measure. My results support the view that parallel trade generates significant savings to consumers and insurers. Furthermore, as the analysis is based on the rules and regulations applying in Denmark, expansion of these results to other geographical markets would require consideration of the relevant local regulations.
Finally, although beyond the scope of this paper, the long-term effects of parallel trade, particularly on incentives to innovate, remain a highly controversial and unresolved question. Because innovation is an important driver of consumer welfare and overall economic well-being, the subject constitutes an important issue for further research.
